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Since the Moynihan reports, the black/white income 
differential has been a puzzling question upon which much 
research has focused. The explanation for this difference ranges 
from Wilson (1987), who believes it stems from the continual 
development of the "underclass", to Murray (1984) who believes 
government programs and income redistribution efforts have made 
blacks relatively worse off, to Reich, who believes black incomes 
are relatively low because of exploitation by white 
"capitalists". 
Most studies have used longitudinal data to back their 
theories and to explain black/white income differential changes 
over time. Not only have black/white ratios changed over time, 
there is a variation in the ratio between standard metropolitan 
statistical areas (SMSAs) at a point in time. It is argued in 
this thesis that much of this difference is caused by structural 
differences between the SMSAs. Examples of these differences 
include family structure, government assistance available, median 
years of schooling, and the percent of manufacturing industry in 
a particular SMSA. Differences of these types are difficult to 
explain in longitudinal studies which usually consider the United 
states as an entirety. Some general questions to be addressed in 
this thesis are 
Are there differences in human capital investments between 
SMSAs? Do these differences affect the black/white income 
differential? 
Are there differences in the industrial structures of the 
SMSAs? Do these differences affect the income differential? 
Are there differences in available public assistance? Do 
these differences affect the income differential? 
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Are there differences in family structure? Do these 
differences affect the income differential? 
The thesis will develop as follows: section II is a 
literature review, section III presents the data base and 
variable definitions, section IV presents the hypotheses, Section 
V shows and discusses the results of the regressions, and the 
conclusion and implications for policy are in section VI. 
section II: Literature Review 
The most read books concerning the black/white income 
differential are Murray's Loosing Ground, Wilson's The Truly 
Disadvantaged, and Reich's Racial Inequality. This literature 
review will look at these three and at several supplemental 
articles. 
Murray spends many chapters presenting data to show that in 
every phase of life, blacks are behind whites-- from educational 
attainment to the wages earned. He claims that a large number of 
blacks do not even try to participate in the work force (p77), 
but blames almost everything on government policy. Murray says 
that the government has made it profitable for blacks to behave 
in short term ways that hurt them in the long term, but this is 
masked with subsidization and the people do not realize what is 
happening to them. To test Murray's hypothesis, we have included 
the variable mean assistance. This variable, taken from the 1980 
Census Data, is added to regressions which have poverty and 
family income as dependent variables to see how much effect 
government assistance has on these elements. If it is highly 
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significant and negative, as Murray suggests, his policy 
prescription of greatly reducing government transfer programs 
will be supported. If not, we turn to Wilson's contention that 
it is not mistakes in government welfare policy, rather it is the 
social and economic environment under which many blacks live that 
causes black family income to be relatively low. 
Wilson believes that years of migration to the suburbs by 
industry and many middle-income black citizens have left the 
inner-city blacks with" poverty, despair, and no one to look to 
for an idea of what life should be like. This inner-city 
"underclass" is defined by Wilson as untrained, unskilled, long-
term unemployed, individuals engaged in street crime, and 
families in long-term poverty (pg8). Wilson contends if the 
neoconservative Murray is correct, the recent tax changes and 
lack of AFDC adjustment for inflation should have been an 
incentive for welfare recipients to work. But that never happened 
(pg17). From his liberal perspective, Wilson claims that special 
attention needs to be given to ghetto-specific cultural 
characteristics such as the relation between joblessness and 
family structure and joblessness and social dislocations such as 
crime and teen pregnancy (pg18). 
The number of black female-headed households has almost 
doubled between 1965 and 1980. Wilson believes this is a 
significant factor especially because the same is not true of 
white families. The increase in female-headed households has had 
a significant effect on black family incomes. Eighty percent of 
black families in 1980 with less than $4000 annual income were 
-. 
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headed by females compared to only 8% of families with household 
incomes over $25,000 (pg27). Reich, a radical economist, agrees 
that the increase in female headed households has affected the 
income differential. The regression model in this thesis 
includes a variable which measures the percentage of families 
which are headed by women. This variable is used by comparing 
the number of families for both blacks and whites to the number 
of female headed households and the difference of this ratio in 
relation to the black/white family income ratio. 
Family structure is also related to investment in human 
capital, such as the decision to get an additional year of 
schooling or the decision to graduate from high school. Wilson 
notes that more than half of blacks in poverty areas have not 
finished high school. Coupled with the fact that a majority of 
poverty families are female headed, there is an indication of a 
direct correlation between low human capital investment and 
family structure. In this thesis, family structure, as measured 
by the percentage of families headed by females, is used as an 
independent variable predicting the median years of schooling in 
the SMSA. 
An important side effect of the difference between the 
number of white female headed households and the number of black 
ones is the effect female labor force participation has on the 
income differential. Reich (pg66) believes that the rapidly 
increasing white female labor force participation has hurt the 
differential because these women are more likely to be married 
than their black counterparts, and, therefore, their earnings add 
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to the white median family income, whereas a black woman's 
earnings are like to be the family income. 
Return on education is also a prime concern in this thesis. 
Human capital is definitely an important factor in income 
potential, but is it equally important to blacks and whites? 
If human capital has the same coefficient for both blacks and 
whites, it is equally important for both. In Labor Economics, 
Marshall and Briggs state that the human capital investment 
theory has policy implications that incomes of all workers could 
be improved by equipping them with more human capital (pg189). 
They cite the Hudson Institute whose figures indicate that in 
1980 only 12.8 years of school were required for current jobs, 
whereas, in the mid to late 80'S 13.5 years will be required for 
new jobs (pg217). Industry has become more technological and 
this has hurt blacks who do not have as high a human capital 
investment rate as whites. 
There is some evidence that the industrial structure of an 
SMSA may be a determinant of black/white income differentials. 
Hyclak and stewart (pg311) found in their empirical studies that 
manufacturing had the greatest effect of all independent 
variables on the black/white income differential. They note, 
" ... the relative importance of manufacturing as a source of 
employment is declining over time. This result has significance 
for future trends in the black/white ratio" (pg310). In this 
thesis the variables DURDIF (the difference between black and 
white durable employment) and PDUR (the percentage of total 
employment in an SMSA concentrated in manufacturing) will measure 
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the intensity of manufacturing activity in SMSAs. 
Another factor in the structure of an SMSA is union 
membership. Many states have right to work laws which tend to 
lessen union membership. These states tend to be in the South 
with a few exceptions. In May of 1980, 34.8% of durable workers 
were organized according to Marshall, Briggs, and King (fifth 
edition,pgl16). Of significant interest for this thesis is 
though blacks represented only 12.8% of the 1980 civilian work 
force, they were 14.9% of unionized workers (pg135). Marshall 
and Briggs (6th edition, pg358) attribute these statistics to the 
high concentration that blacks have in fields that are commonly 
unionized. In their empirical studies, Hyclak and Stewart found 
that unionization is statistically significant and positive in 
relation to the black/white earnings ratio. This thesis uses two 
union factors to measure the effect that union membership has on 
the black/white income differential. The first, PUN I ON , measures 
the percentage of those in the city in a union. The second, 
PRDUNION, measures the percentage in a production union. 
Ashenfelter (Masters, 1975, pg30) found unions, especially 
industrial unions, help blacks do better relative to whites. 
Data for union membership is limited to the top 94 populated 
cities, so results for these variables in this thesis are 
reported separately. 
Gordon (1984) does not include an industrial structure 
variable or a union variable when expanding Rasmussen's income 
differential model. Ignoring the effect of the migration of 
~ blacks to the industrial North is only one problem with Gordon's 
-, 
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model. In his expanded model, he found black political power to 
be significant in determining the black/white income 
differential-- however, he uses the number of black congressmen 
as his black political power proxy. This measure does not state 
whether these are u.s. Congressman or individual state 
congressmen. This is a questionable proxy, also, because it does 
not account for the influence a black mayor or school board 
member has on the chances of blacks doing well relative to 
whites. 
Because the government is the first institution to be 
affected by equal opportunity employment laws and is perhaps the 
most strictly monitored, government employment at all levels 
could easily affect the black/white income differential. Reich 
(pg 128) explains that entry wages in public employment are 
relatively high and that many government workers are low and 
middle-level white collar workers. It is argued in this thesis 
that SMSAs which have high percentages of blacks employed in 
government will have relatively high black/white income ratios. 
This thesis and its data set lends itself well to testing 
Becker's theory of discrimination (McConnell and Brue, 1986) 
which focuses on the percentage of blacks living in a particular 
area. Becker believes the higher the concentration, the more the 
discrimination, which would lead to a lower black/white income 
differential. In this thesis, the variable black/white 
population ratio measures the number of blacks compared to the 
number of whites. There are at least 3000 blacks in every SMSA 
in the data base, and no more than 20% are enrolled in college. 
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Significant and negative results will back Becker's theories. 
other results (either positive or insignificant or neither) might 
indicate that other factors are more influential on the 
differential. 
III. Data Base and Variable Definitions 
The data base used in this thesis is drawn from the 1980 
Census. The advantage of this data base is that SMSA specific 
data on the number of families, the number of female headed 
households, median education, industrial structure, and 
government employment allows for comparisons between cities and 
regions. 
From the data base several variables were selected to test 
the hypotheses stated in the introduction. These variables are 
stated and defined in Table 1. The education variables (WMED 
BMED and BWMEDEDR) are used as both dependent and independent 
variables. For the first hypothesis, they are used as dependent 
variables to determine how much effect other factors of the city 
structure have on human capital investment. 
For the second hypothesis, the education variables are used 
to determine whether return on human capital investment is the 
same between blacks and whites. The dependent variables BFAMIN, 
WFAMIN, and BWFAMINR are the proxies for determining the family 
structure. The independent variables WPGOV, BPGOV and GOVDIF 
allow for testing of Reich's belief that government work helps 
the income differential. WDURP, BDURP, PDUR, and DURDIF are all 
industrial structure variables that show how intensity and 
-Variable Definitions 
~nri,l)lp Name Definition (all variables pertain to individual SMSAs) 
[) r' p" il d (' n t 
P.t1EL' 
h't'IEO 
P,1.'Hr:UEDR 
('.1",\~ll N 
\\' j' ,\ ~1 I f'J 
fWF,\\j DlR 
Variables 
Black Median Years of School 
White N0dian Years of School 
Black Median School/White Median School 
Black Family Median Income 
White Family Median Income 
Blacl, ~1edian Family Income/White Median Family Income 
r II d·" [, (' /I d (' 11 t Va ria b 1 e s 
I\'J 'Gr)V 
(;(l\'l'IF 
Po ilL' I'~ r 
lJliRJIIF 
f'I':Rl"_'[l 
Dl'N J ()N 
PIID' "noN 
PI'.FIIEAIJ 
!'\':F11":1\ Il 
FII F.,I, DlJ J F 
,'r,Et,1P 
::,( 'l'l!I 
Mean Government Assistance Received 
Number of Whi tes Employed in Government/Number of \~hi tes 
Employed 
Number of Blacks Employed in Government/Number of Blacks 
Employed 
Percent of Whites Employed in Government Minus PercFnt 
of Blacks Employed in Government 
Number of Whitl?s Employed in Durable Goods Manufacturing/ 
Number of Whites Employed 
Number of Blacks Employed in Durable Goods Manufacturing/ 
Number of Blacks Employed 
Percent Black Durable Employment Minus Percent White 
Durable Employment 
Number Employed in Durable Goods Manufacturing/Number 
Employed 
Percent of Workers in a Union in Select SMSAs 
Percent of Production Workers in a Union in Select SMSAs 
Number of Black Female Headed Households/Number of Black 
Families 
Number of \~h i te Female Headed Households/Number of While 
Families 
Percent Black Female Headed Households Minus Percent 
White Female Headed Households 
Unemployment Rate 
SMSAs iTI the Western Region--States include Oregon, Utah. 
Washington. California, Idaho, Montana, Wyoming, Alaska, 
Nevada, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas, Oklahoma, and Hawli 
S~ISAs in the Northern Region-- States include ~Iinnesot.'l., 
10 \0.' a. ~l iss 0 uri, \~ i s con sin, I 11 in 0 is, M i chi g an. I n d ian a , 
Ohio, Maine. Vermont, New Hampshire, Maryland. New York, 
MClssachllse t t c:, ('onnrct icut, RhodE" Island, Penns,-l '-an i a, 
DeJaware, and New J0rsey 
SMSAs in 1he Southern Re~ion-- States include Virgillin. 
West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, North Carolina, 
SOlllh Carolina. Arkansas. Texas, Louisiana, Georgia, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. 
Nllmh<:>r nf hlacks/Nllmber of whi.ter:; 
Tah 1(' :2 ~lean Values of Dependent Variables by Region 
(standard deviations in parentheses) 
D('I'~'ndent 
\'al'i.rlbles 
USA West North 
10 
South 
---------------------------------------------------------------
,',m:ll 11.9 12.438 12.056 11 .4·16 
(0.667) ( 0.579) ( .358) ( .712 ) 
h"lrll 12.6 12.785 12.523 12.19~; 
(0.293) ( .244 ) ( .299 ) ( .260 ) 
1'\\~ll':flFIJH 0.945 0.973 0.963 0.916 
(0. OIH) ( .037 ) ( .030) ( .053 ) 
['ff S (; lU\U 53.G8 67.926 54.49 47.215 
( 10.5 ) (10.932) (6.395) ( 7.5 ) 
\,11 S r; 11.\D 69.11 76.97 68.956 66.2·18 
( 7.325 ) ( 6.794 ) ( 5.558 ) ( 6.931 ) 
(; 11 ,\ J) [l I F 
-15 . '16 -9.041 -14.-161 -19.003 
( 7.987 ) (6.618) (6.207) (8.2791 
[~ F /\ 'I [ ~~ 13214.19 11317.59 14452.1 11589.03 
(2516.1) (2692.05) (2:337.31) ( 150:3 .11 ) 
\'.F 11'1 I!';' 21145.51 21802.15 22312.92 19695. 8 ~~ 
(2929.83) (3016.27) (2782.59) (2:391.401 
f~\"F \~11. ~H 0.G27 0.655 0.651 0.592 
( .087 ) ( .072 I ( .096) ( .01)8 ) 
239 39 101 99 
-TahLE' 3 Hean Values of Independent Variables by Region 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
T nc!('pendent 
VarLables 
La], 0 r Sup p 1 ~. 
B~IFD 
nW~1 EDEDR 
HFLFPH 
\'-'FL Fpr~ 
["\"F L FPR D 
USA 
11.9 
(0.667) 
12.6 
(0.293) 
55.4 
(5.938) 
50.03 
(5.015) 
5.37 
( 1 .8,11 I 
2381.14 
(·133.61) 
Labor Demand Variables 
!\[1(;OV 0.28 
\I,'F(;OV 
COVIll F 
WDI'I{P 
DUll J) IF 
PEI/DUR 
t'NPIP 
( .273 ) 
0.163 
( .055 ) 
0.117 
( .260 ) 
0.175 
( .134 I 
0.142 
( .083) 
0.034 
( .082) 
0.153 
( . 131 ) 
6.57 
( 2 • 2 ) 
22.82 
( 9.9:38 ) 
West 
12.438 
(0.579) 
12.785 
( .244 ) 
0.973 
( .037 ) 
57.87 
( 7.29 ) 
52.52 
( 5.01 ) 
5.36 
( -} . 956 ) 
2650.59 
(354.06) 
0.402 
( .649 ) 
0.175 
(,053) 
0.227 
( .633 ) 
0.136 
( .184 ) 
0.1 
( .065) 
0.036 
(,169) 
0.104 
( .065) 
6.51 
(2.06) 
20.77 
(6.21 ) 
North 
12.056 
( .358 ) 
12.523 
( .299) 
0.963 
( .030 ) 
54.87 
(5.636) 
49.82 
(4.503) 
5.049 
( 3.941 ) 
2646.5 
(351.04) 
0.247 
( .072 ) 
0.148 
( .(46) 
0.099 
( .045 ) 
0.256 
( .123 ) 
0.202 
( .079 I 
0.054 
( .06) 
0.223 
( .167 ) 
7.38 
( 2.31 ) 
28.3 
(9.155) 
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South 
11.446 
( .712 ) 
12.'196 
( .260) 
0.916 
(,053) 
54.96 
(5.449) 
49.26 
(5.248) 
5.703 
( 5.598 ) 
2004.28 
(193.23) 
0.266 
1.0711 
0.174 
( .061 ) 
0.092 
( . () 36 ) 
0.108 
( .056) 
0.096 
( .046) 
0.011 
( .027 ) 
0.102 
( .0531 
5.77 
( 1. 81 1 
14.65 
( 7.435 ) 
12 
Fnlllily Strncture 
f'Bf·HE .. \J) 0.374 0.301 0.434 0.341 
( .277 ) ( .075 ) ( .413 ) ( .061 I 
I'WFIlEAD 0.114 0.115 0.126 0.102 
( .090) ( .012 I ( .137 I ( .013 ) 
FHF\f)DIF' 0.259 0.187 0.308 0.239 
( .290) ( .07·1 ) ( .436 ) ( .061 ) 
SalllDle Size 239 39 101 99 
* * ~:; .1 m p 1 e S i z e 95 29 47 26 
-r-
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availability of jobs in durable goods manufacturing affects the 
income differential in an SMSA. PUNION and PRDUNION are 
independent variables that indicate whether unionization in an 
SMSA affects the differential. The three independent variables 
PBFHEAD, PWFHEAD, and FHEADDIF represent family structure in the 
SMSA. Regional variables NORTH, SOUTH, and WEST allow for 
regressions that look not only for differences between SMSAs, but 
for differences between regions of the country. 
MASSIST allows examination of government transfers in a 
particular SMSA to see if transfer are an influence on the 
differential. 
The variable BWPOPR allows for testing of Becker's theory 
and the variable POP indicates whether SMSA size influences the 
black/white income differential. 
IV. The Hypotheses 
From the 1980 SMSA specific Census Data, numerous variables 
were drawn to test two main hypotheses concerning the 
black/white income differential. Each will be discussed in turn. 
The first hypotheses is that higher median level of 
educational attainment for blacks relative to whites will be 
found in cities with fewer black female headed households 
relative to white, a lower percentage of employed blacks in 
manufacturing jobs relative to whites, a higher percent of 
employed blacks working for the government relative to whites, 
and a low black/white population ratio. The hypothesized 
negative relationship between the percentage of families which 
-,,-
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are headed by females is based upon the fact that most female 
headed households are poor and therefore do not have as many 
resources to invest in the human capital of their children. The 
positive relationship hypothesized between educational 
achievement and government employment results from the fact that 
the majority of government jobs require at least a high school 
education. The opposite is true of the manufacturing industry, 
which has historically not required much human capital 
investment, therefore a negative relationship is hypothesized 
between the presence of durable goods manufacturing and 
educational achievement. The black/white population ratio is 
included because of the fact that school's with a high 
concentration of blacks have lower quality of education and thus 
fewer students who are encouraged to stay in high school or 
continue their education afterwards. 
The second hypothesis is that the black/white income 
differential will be larger for cities where black educational 
attainment is high relative to whites after controlling for other 
important determinants that influence the differential. 
In the second hypothesis, the dependent variable is the 
black/white income differential. The differential has been the 
focus of research by conservatives, liberals, and radicals-- the 
literature review cites theories by Murray, Wilson, and Reich 
respectively. All agree that there is a problem with the fact 
that black earnings are low relative to whites, but causes and 
solutions vary. This thesis will test their theories of why the 
difference exists and will attempt to draw some conclusions. 
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Black/white median education is used as an independent 
variable in determining the differential. This will determine if 
Marshall and Briggs are correct in their theory that human 
capital investment improves the black/white income differential. 
Marshall and Briggs (pg189) contend that the incomes of all 
workers could be improved by equipping them with more human 
capital. 
The non-educational variables which will be included in the 
model which tests hypothesis 2 include FHEADDIF, PERDUR, DURDIF, 
BWPOPR, PGOV, GOVDIF, BWFLFPRD, and MASSIST. 
As mentioned in the literature review, the number of female-
headed households is included as an independent variable to test 
Wilson and Reich's contention that a high percent of black 
female-headed households hurts the black/white income 
differential. 
Intensity of manufacturing in an SMSA is included to test 
Hyclak and Stewart's theory that manufacturing and its decline 
will have a great and negative effect on the differential. 
The black/white population ratio is included as an 
independent variable to test Becker's theory of discrimination. 
A negative and significant result is expected. 
The percentage of government employment is included to test 
Reich's theory that high government employment helps the 
differential because these jobs tend to be high paying even at 
the entry level where blacks are often found. 
The female labor force participation rate ratio is included 
as an independent variable in testing the second hypothesis to 
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examine Reich's contention that high white female participation 
has hurt the differential because it usually adds to a family 
income, whereas a black woman's income is the family income. It 
is expected that this variable will be positive and significant. 
The independent variable mean assistance is used to test 
Murray's theory that government assistance hurts the black/white 
income differential, and wilson's contradicting contention that 
it has no significant effect. If Murray is correct, the 
coefficient to MASSIST will be negative and significant. If 
Wilson is correct, it will be statistically insignificant. 
Separate regressions have been run to test the effect of 
unionization on the black/white income differential because the 
data is limited to the 94 largest cities. Marshall, Briggs, 
King, Ashenfelter, Hyclak and Stewart, as noted in the literature 
review, all have found a positive and significant relationship 
between unionization and the black/white income differential. 
V. Empirical Model and Results 
For the initial hypothesis two areas were included in 
building the model to test the causes of differences in human 
capital i.nvestment between blacks and whites: 1) a variable to 
measure cultural differences, especially family structure and 2) 
variables to measure market structure. The basic model is 
specified as follows: 
BWMEDEDR = a + b1(FHEADDIF) + b2(PERDUR) + b3(PGOV) 
+ b4(DURDIF) + b5(GOVDIF) + b6(BWPOPR) 
Each variable as defined in Table 1 was also examined from a race 
specific point of view to determine if some of the variations 
'I ahl E' 1. He~ression Resul ts for Selected Samples: Black/Hhi te 
Median Education Ratio: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses 
\' ,'l ria b l e Total West North South 
Name Sample Sample Sample Sample 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
FIIE·\DD I F -0.01 
( -1 .00) 
n:HIlL'H 0.51** 
( 2.14 ) 
PI ;0\' 0.01 
(0.28) 
fJPfWl F -0.0:1 
(-0.641 
r,()V{lIF 0.03 
( 1. 56) 
UKP()PR 
-0.17*** 
(-8.71 ) 
Cnnstant 0.97*** 
r\dj. I~-Squared 0.291 
Sample Size 239 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
*-1: Si!1;llificant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .D1 level. 
-0.17* -0.01 -0.19** 
(-1.93) ( -0.9 'I) ( -0.23 ) 
0.23* 0.01 0.21** 
(1.74) (0.23 ) ( 2.30 ) 
0.06 0.01 -0.02 
(0.36 ) (0.60) (-0.23) 
-0.16 -0.06 0.08 
(-0.73 ) (-0.93) (0.13 ) 
0.05 -0.05 0.40*** 
(0.80) (-0.60) (2.81 I 
0.11 -0.11*** -0.12*** 
(0.83 ) (-2.72) (-3.86) 
0.96*** 0.98*** 0.94*** 
0.056 0.0549 0.233 
39 101 99 
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Table 5. Re~ression Results for Selested Samples: White 
Median Education: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Vari:=tble Total' West North South 
~l.1.me Sample Sample Sample Sample 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
I'h'FllE/\D 0.15 4.91 
(0. i i ) ( 1. 38) 
"'Dt' [II' -0.50** 0.59 
(-1.99) (0.85 ) 
\,'PGIl\' 1.59*** 1. 00 
( 4 .36 ) ( 1.08 ) 
n\vPI ll'l? 
-0.26** -0.48 
(-2.03) (-0.54) 
1.'0n:"tant 12.39*** 12.02*** 
!\d.i. H-Squared 0.124 
S,'\mJ'J e Size 239 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Si~nificant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
-0.034 
39 
0.13 -1 .69 
(0.63 ) ( -0.9:3 ) 
-0.25 -1.23** 
(-0.59) ( -2. 2G ) 
1.92*** 1.67*** 
( 2.69 ) ( :~ . 98 ) 
0.85** -0.07 
( 2.40) (-0.46 ) 
12.19*** 12.51*** 
0.166 0.197 
101 99 
Table 6. Re~rE'ssion Results for Selected Samples: Black 
Median Education: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Vari.able 
Name 
E'BFIIEAD 
eDUEF 
PFGOV 
E\WP()FH 
('on<; t 8 nt 
,\d.i. H-Sq\lared 
Samp l c' Size 
Total· 
Sample 
-0.1.'1 
(-0.99) 
0.01 
(0.04 ) 
0.31** 
( 2 .07 ) 
-2.21*** 
(-8.13) 
12.19*** 
0.2·11 
239 
"t ~~ l1t n i f i can tat the . 1 Ole vel . 
West 
Sample 
-3.60*** 
(-2.98) 
1. 55 
( 1. 57) 
-0.36 
(-1.26) 
1. 89 
(0.96) 
13.34*** 
0.153 
39 
"t* ~;ignificant at the .05 level. 
"t** Si~nificant at the .01 level. 
North 
Sample 
-0.11 
(-1.25) 
-0.46 
(-1.14) 
-0.04 
(-0.06) 
-0.58 
(-1.20) 
12.29*** 
0.003 
101 
South 
Sample 
-1 .59 
(-1.47) 
1. 67 
( 1. 33) 
2.93*** 
(2.88 ) 
-1.60*** 
(-3.94) 
11.44*** 
0.173 
99 
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could be attributed to either blacks or whites. These models are 
specified as follows: 
WMED = a + b1(PWFHEAD) + b2(WDURP) + b3(WPGOV) + b4(BWPOPR) 
BMED = a + b1(PBFHEAD) + b2(BDURP) + b3(BPGOV) + b4(BWPOPR) 
Each of these models was run for the entire sample of 239 SMSAs, 
and then again for three broad regions-- North, South, and West 
The states in each region are listed in Table 1. 
The results of the regressions which test Hypothesis 1 are 
reported in Tables 4, 5, and 6. Regression results for 
Hypothesis 2 are reported in Tables 7, 8, and 9. Regression 
results limited by the union variable are reported in Tables 10, 
11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. 
In the regressions for Hypothesis 1, the proxy for family 
structure, FHEADDIF, shows no significance in the United states 
as a whole in predicting the median number of years of schooling 
that blacks attain relative to whites. Therefore, it is not 
possible to accept our research hypothesis that a high ratio of 
black female-headed households relative to whites would have a 
negative affect on the black/white median education ratio. Yet 
at the regional level there is weak evidence of a negative 
relationship between educational achievement and family structure 
in the West and the South as shown in Table 4. 
The proxies to measure market structure; PERDUR, DURDIF, 
GOVDIF, and PGOV, had little effect on black/white median 
education ratios with the exception of PERDUR. The positive and 
significant result indicates that cities with a high percentage 
of total employment in the manufacturing area increases the 
21 
educational achievement of blacks relative to whites. Therefore, 
the research hypothesis must be rejected. This thesis had 
hypothesized that high intensity of manufacturing would have a 
negative effect on the black/white median education variable. 
The explanation for this may be rooted in the practice of the 
manufacturing industry of hiring high school graduates. Because 
the median years of school achieved by a black is less than that 
required to graduate (Table 2) the presence of available 
manufacturing jobs and good wages could be enough to keep a black 
person in high school, but provide no incentive for further human 
capital investment. But when examining the race specific 
regression in Table 6, the manufacturing industry does not have a 
significant effect on black educational achievement. This is not 
true of whites. When the race specific regression is examined 
(Table 5) the presence of durable goods manufacturing has a 
significant and negative effect on white educational achievement. 
The median years of school achieved by a white is more than that 
required to graduate as shown in Table 2. This indicates that 
whites in cities with high intensity manufacturing realize that a 
high school diploma is enough to earn a good income and lose the 
incentive to invest in further training. Therefore, the 
positive effect of durable goods manufacturing on the black/white 
median education ratio is actually because whites are adversely 
affected, not because blacks are positively affected. 
The variable BWPOPR is negative and significant at the .01 
level not only in the united states as a whole, but also in the 
- North and the South. These results are consistent with what was 
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hypothesized. The negative coefficient indicates that with a 
concentration of blacks in an SMSA, human capital investment 
decreases. This supports Wilson's theories of the underclass 
which states that those left in the SMSAs are low achievers, and 
that their problems are perpetuated by bad schools (or no school) 
and lack of role models because those who do achieve leave the 
SMSA for the suburbs. When race specific regressions are run, 
BWPOPR is a significant and negative variable for BOTH blacks and 
whites though the magnitude of the coefficient is significantly 
less for whites than blacks. This indicates that SMSA with a 
high black/white population ratio lessens not only black 
educational investment, but white investment, also, in the United 
states as a whole. 
For the second hypothesis the model is specified as follows: 
BWFAMINR = a + b1(BWMEDEDR) + b2(BWFLFPRD} + b3(BWFHEADR} 
+ b4(PERDUR} + b5(PGOV} + b6(DURDIF} + b7(GOVDIF} 
+ b8(BWPOPR) 
Results for this regression are shown in Table 7. Each variable, 
as defined in Table 1, is also examined in race specific 
regressions. They are specified as follows: 
WFAMIN = a + b1(WFLFPR) + b2(PWFHEAD) + b3(WDURP) + 
b4(WPGOV) + b5(BWPOPR) + b6(WMED) 
BFAMIN = a + b1(BFLFPR} + b2(PBFHEAD} + b3(BDURP} + 
b4(BPGOV) + b5(BWPOPR) + b6(BMED} 
Results for these regressions are shown in Tables 8 and 9, 
respectively. 
In conjunction with the first hypothesis which examines what 
Table 7. Regression Results for Selected Samples: Black/White 
Family Income Ratio: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
~ame 
BWMEDEDR 
BWFLFPRD 
BWFHEADR 
PERDt.:R 
PGO\-
DURDIF 
GO\'DIF 
BWPOPR 
pop (X 1000) 
MASSIST(X 1000) 
REGION NORTH 
REGION SOUTH 
Constant 
Adj. R-Squared 
Sample Size 
Total 
Sample 
0.42*** 
(3.59) 
0.005*** 
(-1.96) 
-0.005*** 
(-3.16 ) 
0.05 
(1. 06) 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
0.38*** 
(3.69) 
-0.086*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.049 
(-1.09) 
0.00 
(-0.48\ 
-0.0036** 
(-2.26) 
-0.014 
(-1.03) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.81) 
0.3224** 
O. :3813 
239 
Total 
Sample 
0.52*** 
(-L65) 
0.005*** 
(4.67) 
-0.004*** 
(-2.91) 
0.05 
(1. 08) 
0.007 
(0.186) 
.39*** 
(-1.16 ) 
-.09*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.09** 
(-2.24 ) 
O. 1 ~.'.2 
0.375 
239 
West 
Sample 
0.138 
(0.47) 
0.007*** 
(3.00 ) 
-0.02 
(-1.47) 
0.24 
( 1. 18) 
-0.03 
(-0.11) 
-0.06 
(-0.18) 
-0.03 
(-0.31) 
-0.07 
( -0.37) 
0.525* 
Ll.171 
39 
~orth 
Sample 
1.18*** 
(4.30) 
0.007*** 
(3.32 ) 
-0.004* 
(-1. 95) 
0.35 
(0.61 ) 
0.00 
(-0.06) 
0.56*** 
(3.31) 
-0.34 
(-1.54) 
-0.09 
(-0.83) 
-0.572** 
0.:363 
10~ 
23 
South 
Sample 
-0.05 
(-0.11 ) 
0.003** 
(1. 95) 
-0.047*** 
~-5.25) 
0.26** 
(2.39) 
-0.17** 
(-1.95) 
0.30 
(~.38) 
-0.01 
(-0.07) 
-0.11** 
(-2.17 ) 
0.814*** 
0.413 
99 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Si gnif icant at the .05 l<?yel. 
*** Signif icant at the .01 level. 
,-
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Table 8. Regression Results for Selected Samples: White Family 
Income: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
~ame 
WMED 
WFLFPR 
PWFHEAD 
WDURP 
WPGOV 
Bh"POPR 
pop (X 1000) 
MASSIST(X 1000) 
REG ION ~ORTH 
REGIO~ SOl'TH 
Total 
Sample 
5-178.15*** 
(11.50) 
159.65*** 
(6.49 ) 
-1356.09 
(-1.10) 
189.35 
(0.10 I 
Total 
Sample 
6294.58*** 
(12.29) 
151.40*** 
(5.39 ) 
607.57 
(0.43 ) 
8-l25.23*** 
(4.689) 
-15815.4*** -15827.6*** 
(-6.64) (-5.9) 
3994.25*** 2489.65*** 
(4.18) (2.69) 
0.20* 
(1. 79) 
984.93** 
(2.55 ) 
1830.49*** 
(-L86) 
-76.54 
-0.17 
West 
Sample 
4260.74*** 
(2.60) 
316.04*** 
(-1. 11) 
16862.97 
(0.58 ) 
7435.14 
(1. 32) 
!\orth 
Sample 
South 
Sample 
6824.48*** -l998.39*** 
(10.311 (6.731 
63.35 173.30*** 
(1.56) (5.071 
-355.24 -20917.52 
(-0.31) (-1.60) 
-663.92 -1992.40 
(-0.27) (-0.50) 
440.39 -20655.36*** -17128.19*** 
(0.059) (-4.90) (-5.44) 
1653.15 8941.95*** 3441.99*** 
(0.236) (4.29) (3.32) 
Constant -56764*** -64528.97*** -52123.87*** -63959.28*** -46891.-l0*** 
Adj. R-Squared 
Sample Size 
0.674 0.561 0.57 0.688 0.544 
239 239 39 101 99 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
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Table 9. Regression Results for Selected Samples: Black Familv 
Income: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
\'ame 
BMED 
BFLFPR 
PBFHEAD 
BDl'RP 
Total 
Sample 
713.36*** 
(3.47 ) 
189.67*** 
(10.05) 
-1082.48*** 
(-2.86) 
5749.17*** 
(5.53) 
Total 
Sample 
1320.67*** 
(6.62) 
162.72*** 
(7.98 ) 
-721. 81* 
(-1. 75) 
7778.5*** 
(8.13 ) 
BPGOV -1020.7** -1347.25*** 
(-2.33) (-2.99) 
BWPOPR 2663.87*** 
(2.82) 
pop (X 1000) 0.15 
1. 39 
MASSIST(X 1000} 389.65 
(1. 08) 
REGION NORTH 190.42 
(0.54 ) 
REGION SOVTH -1591.76*** 
Constant 
Adj. R-Squared 
Sample Size 
(-3.55) 
-6918.50*** 
0.607 
239 
747.38 
(0.80) 
12276.35*** 
0.52 
239 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 leyel. 
*** Significant at the .01 le'."el. 
West 
Sample 
752.17 
( 1. 06) 
217.34*** 
(3.92 ) 
-1761.98 
(-0.378) 
5295.98 
(1.5!) 
-877.83 
(-0.89) 
-3959.5 
(0.59 ) 
}iorth 
Sample 
3056.89*** 
(6.35 ) 
140.67*** 
(L 65) 
South 
Sample 
195.84 
(1. (6) 
140.89*** 
(5.55 ) 
-604.78 -6745.39*** 
(-1.52) (-3.~5l 
9860.73*** 
(5. to) 
1743.51 
(0.77) 
5732.56* -5003.54*** 
(1.88) (-2.54) 
6120.87*** 
(2.80) 
1844.93** 
(2.27 ) 
-7203.82 -3l417.79*** 4570.33* 
0.124 
99 
0.561 0.531 
39 101 
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factors influence human capital investment, the second hypothesis 
considers how much influence this investment has on the 
black/white income differential. The regression results shown in 
Table 7 indicate that the black/white median education ratio has 
a positive and highly significant effect on the black/white 
income differential. This result allows hypothesis 2 to be 
accepted in the area of human capital investment. When median 
educational achievement is examined in race specific regressions 
(Tables 8 and 9) it is shown that education is positive and 
significant for both blacks and whites. But the coefficient for 
whites is almost five times higher than for blacks. This 
indicates that human capital investment is important for both 
blacks and whites, but the return on this investment is 
significantly greater for whites. 
Most of the non-educational independent variables had a 
statistically significant effect on the black/white income 
differential with the exception of PERDUR and PGOV. PERDUR, 
which measures the intensity of manufacturing in an SMSA, is 
insignificant in the entire sample, therefore the hypothesis 
that PERDUR is directly related to the black/white income 
differential cannot be accepted. This finding does not support 
Seeborg's results for the Great Lakes regional study where PERDUR 
was a significant predictor of the differential. This may 
indicate that trends in the area of manufacturing intensity are 
not the same throughout the United states. Also in the area of 
market structure is the variable DURDIF, which measures the 
difference in concentration between blacks and whites in durable 
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goods manufacturing. This variable is significant and positive 
at the one percent level. This indicates that if manufacturing 
employment is readily available to blacks there is a positive and 
significant effect on BWFAMINR. Therefore industrial structure 
of an SMSA does effect the black/white income differential, but 
only in its availability, not its intensity. 
The independent variable PGOV also has no significant 
effect, on the black/white income differential, therefore this 
part of the second hypothesis must be rejected. These results 
also disprove Reich's (pg128) theory that government employment 
helps the black/white income differential is incorrect. When PGOV 
is viewed in the race specific regressions it is highly 
significant and negative for both blacks and whites, but the 
intensity of the coefficient almost ten times higher for whites 
than for blacks. A possible explanation for the negative 
coefficients is that both blacks and whites could earn more in 
the private sector, but if they cannot get these jobs, they must 
turn to government employment, where wages are not as high. 
Because of the difference in the coefficients, whites obviously 
receive a better return in the private sector than blacks, 
therefore, public employment is a more negative step for whites. 
Also, during the time of the Census, CETA was operating, and 
people were filtered into public employment and these government 
jobs frequently paid only minimum wage. 
The independent variable BWFLFPRD is highly significant and 
positive in its effect on the black/white income differential. 
This is the hypothesized result. When examining the race 
~ 
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specific regressions in Tables 8 and 9, this variable is highly 
significant and positive for both blacks and whites and the 
coefficients are of similar magnitude. The closeness in the 
magnitude of the coefficients indicates that white and black 
women receive similar returns when they participate in the work 
force. 
Becker's theory of discrimination is supported by the 
results of the regression for the second hypothesis (Table 7.) 
The variable BWPOPR is negative and significant at the five 
percent level for the entire sample. This is the hypothesized 
result-- the black/white population ratio has a negative effect 
on the black/white income differential. When the BWPOPR is 
examined in race specific regressions, Tables 8 and 9, one can 
see that the negative and significant effect the ratio has on the 
income differential actually results from whites earning more in 
SMSAs with a high black/white population ratio, not from blacks 
earning less in these SMSAs. This may indicate that Becker(1957) 
was incorrect when he hypothesized that a competitive market 
would lessen discrimination. The positive effect of BWPOPR on 
white incomes indicates that employers are indeed still willing 
to pay higher wages to obtain white workers, yet they have 
managed to stay profitable through the years. 
The black/white income differential is negatively effected 
by a high percentage of female headed households in an SMSA 
(Table 7.) This is the hypothesized result. This is strongly 
supportive of Wilson's underclass concept and indicates that his 
figures that contend that a large portion of families in poverty 
.-
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are headed by women are correct (pg27). 
In a more comprehensive regression than those discussed in 
this thesis, the variable MASSIST was included to measure the 
effect government assistance has on the black/white family income 
ratio (Tables 7, 8, and 9.) The variable is significant at the 
five percent level and negative in its effect on the black/white 
income differential. But when examining the coefficient for 
MASSIST, one can see that is quite small. When the results for 
MASSIST are examined (Tables 8 and 9) there is a positive and 
significant effect on white family incomes, but no significant 
effect on black incomes. This contradicts Murray who claims that 
government transfer payments have hurt blacks. 
To measure the variable unionization, separate regressions 
were run because the data is limited to the 94 largest SMSAs. 
The variable PUNION measures the percent of employed persons in 
unions in that SMSA, whereas PRDUNION measures the percent of 
employed persons in production unions in that SMSA. The data 
was gathered from the Industrial and Labor ?.e12_tions ~~,eview (1979). 
The models are as follows: 
BWFAMINR = a + bl(BWMEDEDR) + b2(BWFLFPRD) + b3(FHEADDIF) 
+ b4(BWPOPR) + b5(PRDUNION) 
BWFAMINR = a + bl(BWMEDEDR) + b2(BWFLFPRD) + b3(FHEADDIF) 
+ b4(BWPOPR) + b5(PUNION) 
Each of these models was also run in race specific regressions. 
The models are as follows: 
WFAMIN = a + bl(WMED) + b2(WFLFPR) + b3(PWFHEAD) 
+ b4(BWPOPR) + b5(PRDUNION) 
Table 10. Regression Results for the Large SMSA Sample: White 
Family Income: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
Name 
WMED 
WFLFPR 
PWFHEAD 
BWPOPR 
PUNION 
PHDUNION 
Constant 
Adj. R-Squared 
Sample Size 
Model 1 
3649.42*** 
(4.73) 
185.74*** 
(3 . 58) 
365.96 
(0.29) 
3926.17*** 
(2.76) 
87.21*** 
(6.32) 
-37020.98*** 
0.48 
94 
Model 2 
3655.60*** 
(4.70) 
198.95*** 
(3.75) 
581. 33 
(0.45) 
4315.88*** 
(2.98) 
122.92*** 
(6.11) 
-37639.87*** 
0.467 
94 
30 
------------------------------------------------------------------
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
Table 11. Regression Results for the Large SMSA Sample: Black 
Family Income: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
Name 
BMED 
BFLFPR 
PBFHEAD 
BWPOPR 
PUNION 
PRDUNION 
Constant 
Adj. R-Squared 
Sample Size 
Model 1 
1306.33*** 
(2.99) 
228.21*** 
(5.77) 
-7385*** 
(-2.86) 
1260-.63 
(0.89) 
79.42*** 
(5.56) 
-14866.95*** 
0.528 
94 
* Significant at the .10 level. 
** Significant at the .05 level. 
*** Significant at the .01 level. 
Model 2 
1371.17*** 
(3.32) 
241. 22*** 
(6.31) 
-7457.91*** 
(-2.87) 
1913.77 
(1.39) 
122.21*** 
(6.38) 
16654.59*** 
0.564 
94 
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~hl", 12. Rp~ression Results for the Large SHSA Sample: Black/White 
Family Income Ratio: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
VIlI'j:}ble 
N::Imp 
B\"~lFDEI!J{ 
8\-,'1-[ rr' I t J) 
BhFII E.1\ \lIt 
m,'P!JPI? 
P1}~1 [Ot\ 
PRU'l~H( IN 
en II '-0 t;) n t 
Ad ,i . II ~ ~~"I\arpd 
Sill11FLr Si,:e 
~Iodel 1 
0.78*** 
( ,1 . 1 1 I 
0.01*** 
( 5.34 ) 
-0.02** 
(-2.~39) 
-0.10* 
(-1.96) 
0.00 
(0.88 ) 
-0.10 
0.511 
9-1 
* Si~nificant at the .10 level. 
*1' Sigt,il'icant at the .05 level. 
**~' Si£fnificnnt at the .01 level. 
Hodel 2 
0.74*** 
( 3.96 ) 
0.01*** 
(5.48 ) 
-0.02*** 
(-2.65) 
-0.09* 
(-1.87) 
-.001* 
(1.77) 
-0.06 
0.524 
94 
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WFAMIN = a + b1(WMED) + b2(WFLFPR) + b3(PWFHEAD) 
+ b4(BWPOPR) + b5(PUNION) 
BFAMIN = a + b1(BMED) + b2(BFLFPR) + b3(PBFHEAD) 
+ b4(BWPOPR) + b5(PRDUNION) 
BFAMIN = a + b1(BMED) + b2(BFLFPR) + b3(PBFHEAD) 
+ b4(BWPOPR) + b5(PUNION) 
The effect of unionization in general on the black/white 
income differential is negative and significant at the ten 
percent level. Membership in production unions has no 
significant effect on the income differential. Both of these 
results, as shown in Table 10, cause the hypothesis to be 
rejected. Hyclak and stewart, using 1970 data on 49 SMSAs, had 
concluded that unionization has a statistically significant and 
positive effect on the differential (pg 311). In effort to more 
closely replicate Hyclak and stewart's data base, the union 
regressions were run again, this time using earnings, not income, 
as the dependent variable. Earnings is a more correct dependent 
than income because union membership would not affect outside 
sources of income such as property holdings, government 
transfers, and inheritances. This change had surprising results. 
The black/white earnings ratio is positively and significantly 
affected by PUNION and PRDUNION. The results (Tables 13, 14, and 
15) are highly supportive of Hyclak and stewart. PUNION has 
twice the effect of PRDUNION which indicates that cities with 
overall high unionization rather than just high production 
unionization have a smaller black/white earnings ratio. The 
overall result agrees also with Ashenfelter who believes unions 
,-
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TabLe 13. Regression Results for the Large SMSA Sample: White 
Earnings: 1979 It statistics in parentheses) 
Variable 
t'!am(> 
\';FLFPR 
F'WFIIE/\ D 
BWI'( lPR 
r'u~1 rUN 
['RIlt)[\! I ON 
Con~; t "tnt 
,\cl.i. [i-Squared 
Sample Size 
Model 1 
3039.16*** 
( 3.84 ) 
123.92** 
( 2 . 32 ) 
-254.88** 
(-2.18) 
36.34** 
(2.49) 
80.41*** 
( 5.66 ) 
-22802.21** 
0.384 
94 
* Sj~nificant at the .10 level. 
"'* Sig-Ilificant at the .05 level. 
'1'** Sj~nificant at the .01 level. 
Model 2 
3034.87*** 
( 3.77 ) 
134.22** 
(2.44) 
-253.56** 
( -2.13 ) 
39.41*** 
( 2.64 ) 
110.23*** 
( 5.30 ) 
-23057.09** 
0.363 
94 
,-
Table 1\. Regression Results for the Lar1i:!e S~SA Sample: Black 
E8rnin~s: 1979 (t statistics in parentheses) 
\. a l' i. aid e 
~lamf' 
mlEll 
£IF!. FPI,{ 
['BFIIEAD 
D\vI'OPR 
['U~J ION 
I'Rl'UN T ON 
Con':; t ant 
Adj. H-Squared 
~aJII~)l.e Size 
Model 1 
972.28** 
( 2.35 ) 
174.66*** 
( 4 . 66) 
-33.68 
(-1.30) 
18.98 
(1.41) 
90.03*** 
( 6 . 6·l ) 
-7808.10 
0.456 
91 
'" :;; i ~lli ficant at the .10 level. 
** :;i~nificant at the .05 level. 
**~ Significant at the .01 level. 
Model 2 
1079.07*** 
( 2 . 74) 
184.33*** 
( 5.05 ) 
-27.58 
(-1.11) 
25.58* 
( 1.94 ) 
133.13*** 
( 7 .27 ) 
-9886.83** 
O. :190 
94 
'1'.<11, I p 15. Re~ression Results for the Large SMSA Sample: Black/White 
Earnings Ratio: 1979 It statistics in parentheses) 
Val'iahle 
Nfln1'"' 
B"~IEDi':[lH 
m,']" L Ft'I.' \) 
B\\ I'll Ei\ PH 
B\\'T'np[;, 
Pt'~; IO~: 
PHIllJ~J I (J~J 
Const:lllt 
Ad.i . R-S'!llared 
Snmple SizE:' 
Hodel 1 
0.31* 
( 1. 95) 
0.003*** 
( 2.91 ) 
-0.013 
(-1.62) 
-0.001*** 
( -3.01 ) 
0.001*** 
( 3.58) 
o . ·111 *** 
o . ·t 16 
9·1 
* Si~nificant at the .10 level. 
** Siltllificant at the .U5 level. 
* * :t. S i ~ II i fie ant at the . 0 1 1 e \' e 1 . 
Model 2 
0.29:3* 
(1.91) 
0.003*** 
( 3.02 ) 
-0.013* 
(-1.82) 
-0.001*** 
( -2.91 ) 
0.002*** 
(4.60 ) 
0.428*** 
0.46 
94 
-. 
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help blacks, but contradicts his finding that industrial unions 
are more helpful than craft unions. When examining the 
coefficients for the race specific regressions (Tables 14 and 15) 
one can see that a one percent rise in production union 
membership in an SMSA results in a $90.03 earnings increase for 
blacks, but only an $80.41 increase for whites. It is important 
to note though that blacks and whites both benefit from 
production union membership. General union membership has an 
even more positive affect on black and white incomes, $133.13 and 
$110.23 respectively. Combined with the findings of Marshall, 
Briggs, and King (5th edition) that blacks tend to be over 
represented in unions, unionization becomes an important 
determinant in black/white earnings ratio. Unfortunately, union 
membership has started to decline. Because blacks benefit most 
from union membership, this decline will, ceritus paribus, lower 
black incomes relative to white incomes. 
In the union regressions, the other variables acted similar 
to the regression which included all 239 SMSAs. 
VI. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
The two-fold purpose of this thesis was to discover what 
factors influence human capital investment and how human capital 
investment and other factors influence the black/white income 
differential. 
The results for the first hypothesis which tested variables 
influencing the relative educational achievement of blacks to 
32 
whites found family structure had little effect on educational 
achievement. Neither did government employment. The two 
variables that do affect black human capital investment relative 
to white are BWPOPR and PERDUR. 
The black/white population ratio has a negative and 
significant effect on both black and white incomes (Tables 4, 5, 
and 6.) This negative effect, though, is approximately eight and 
a half times larger for blacks than whites. This supports 
wilson's underclass theory that large concentrations of low 
income minorities results in the development of a self-
reproducing "underclass." If blacks receive a poor education, 
they have no skills to remove themselves from the underclass 
neighborhoods, and this is true with their children and 
grandchildren, etc. This indicates that cities with high 
black/white population ratios need to pay special attention to 
the schools-- perhaps lessen the student/teacher ratio, provide 
incentive for "good" teachers to come and stay there, and 
incentives for students to stay in school. 
The other factor that was significant in predicting black 
human capital investment relative to white is PERDUR, which 
measures the percentage of durable goods manufacturing in a city. 
This variable, which showed positive and significant for the 
ratio (Table 4), actually proved to have a negative influence on 
white human capital investment and no significant affect on 
blacks (Tables 5 and 6.) cities with high manufacturing simply 
do not require high levels of education. But over the past 
couple of decades, as employment in manufacturing has declined, 
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this requirement has and will continue to change. Manufacturing 
jobs that are available are now requiring computer, electronic, 
and other skills. A Hudson Institute study has determined that 
median education requirements will have increased by at least 
eight tenths of a year in the 1980's (Marshall, pg217.) This 
reinforces the idea that increasing emphasis needs to be placed 
on education, especially in those SMSAs where manufacturing is a 
significant part of the economy. 
There is still a gap between white and black education and 
changes need to be made to bridge the gap, but Buchele (1982) has 
found that the education gap between blacks and whites has 
narrowed, but a much larger gap exists between black and white 
earnings. 
This leads us directly to the results of hypothesis 2 which 
tested the significance of education and other factors on the 
black/white income differential. 
In Tables 8 and 9, the black and white benefits from 
educational investment are measured in dollars. The coefficients 
for WMED and BMED are $6294.58 and $1320.67 respectively. This 
agrees with Buchele's findings that, although the education gap 
has narrowed, this has not had as great an effect on the 
black/white income differential as one would expect. The reason 
is that returns are only one-fifth as great for blacks as for 
whites. What causes this difference in returns is difficult to 
determine. It could be the underclass problem in which the 
minorities living in these underclass neighborhoods do not hear 
about available jobs outside their area. Even if a member of 
40 
this group managed to graduate and perhaps take some vocational 
training, according to Wilson, she/he would still not have the 
same chances of capturing a "good" job as a person who is not 
handicapped by living in an underclass neighborhood because the 
flow of job information does not extend into these areas. Only a 
small percentage of jobs are actually advertised in newspapers 
which may be the only source a person has for finding a job. 
This difference in return on education could very well be the 
answer to the question: Why is there such a large gap between 
black and white incomes? But the answer that they do not get the 
same returns on education leaves another question: Why don't 
blacks receive the same return on education that whites do? The 
underclass theory is one possibility, but probably not the only 
answer. This is an issue that definitely needs further 
exploration. 
Another area where blacks and whites differ is in returns to 
durable goods manufacturing employment. The difference is 
slight, however, with coefficients of $84.25 and $77.79 for 
whites and blacks respectively. This could be a result of the 
difference in median age between blacks and whites. The median 
white age in an SMSA is anywhere from seven to ten years greater 
than the median black age. This would put white durable goods 
employees higher on the seniority list which usually means 
slightly higher pay. This variable does indicate that an SMSA 
that can attract durable goods manUfacturing can increase the 
median family incomes of both its black and white citizens. 
A variable less able to be controlled by an SMSA is the 
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number of female-headed households. strongly supportive of 
wilson's (1987) theory of the underclass is the negative and 
significant coefficient for BWFHEADR, which compares the percent 
of black female-headed households to the percent of white female-
headed households. But Wilson is not supported by the figures in 
this thesis in the area of government assistance. Wilson 
believes that transfer payments are not significant. Murray's 
(1984) supposition that transfer payments have a negative and 
significant impact is not supported by this study. In the race 
specific regressions (Tables 8 and 9) MASSIST is not a 
significant determinant in black incomes and has a positive 
effect on white incomes. It is disturbing, however, to find 
MASSIST has a more favorable effect on white incomes than on 
black incomes when these programs are designed to help 
minorities. This thesis examines only the effect that MASSIST 
has on median family incomes. Because of this, the results are 
difficult to assign importance to because MASSIST is most likely 
to have an effect on those at the lower end of the income 
spectrum, not those in the middle. 
The variable female labor force participation rates has a 
positive bearing on the future. An increase in this rate not 
only helps the BWFAMINR, but helps both black and white family 
incomes. This positive and significant variable shows only a 
slight difference ($0.11) between black and white benefits from a 
one percent increase in female labor force participation. This 
variable has good future trends because the female labor force 
participation rate has increased and seems to be continuing to do 
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so. Though the rise will not have a large influence in the 
black/white income differential, it still has a positive effect. 
The negative result government employment has on the 
differential and on black and white incomes (Tables 7, 8, and 9) 
indicates less government employment is desirable in an SMSA if 
one wants to improve the differential and both black and white 
incomes. Because CETA, which was active at the time of the 1979 
Census, employed persons through the government at minimum and 
low wages, it is expected that this variable will see significant 
improvement after the effects of JTPA are felt. Because JTPA 
promotes training and employment in higher paying private sector 
jobs, many of the low paying public sector jobs have vanished, 
leaving what Reich (pg 128) describes as low and middle-level 
white collar jobs that are common with government employment. 
Reich's theory that government employment will help the 
differential was disproved with this data, but perhaps with 1990 
Census data would prove correct. 
The variable BWPOPR acted as Becker predicted, it had a 
negative and significant effect on the black/white income 
differential (Table 7.) But the reason (Tables 8 and 9) is that 
whites do significantly better in SMSAs with high black/white 
population ratios, not that blacks do worse. 
The final variable examined in relation to the black/white 
income differential is unionization. The strong results of 
unionization when used with the dependent variable earnings 
(Tables 13, 14, and 15) indicates that Hyclak and stewart's 1970 
findings that unionization helps the differential still holds 
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true in 19S0. The positive significance of this variable 
suggests that the government needs to help promote unions in the 
face of rapidly declining membership-- perhaps to revise right-
to-work laws so that they encourage workers to join union, 
perhaps to support worker solidarity by urging companies to 
bargain with union leaders before strikes are necessary which 
would eliminate the negative image unions have of causing 
strikes. Also, there is a rise in the number of white collars 
workers, which embraces many government jobs. If the government 
would encourage the formation of these union, other companies 
might realize the importance of unions for white collar workers. 
Any policy that puts a positive light on unions and shows the 
benefits of unionization would help both the black/white income 
differential and black and white family incomes. 
Future research indicated by the results of this thesis are 
especially strong in the area of black and white educational 
returns. Why is this difference so great? Would the lessening 
of this difference in educational returns reduce the black/white 
income differential? Also, with the approach of the 1990 Census, 
research possibilities indicate a study similar to this to 
determine how much influence the reduction of durable goods 
manufacturing has had on the black/white income differential. 
The opportunity to expand a cross-sectional study like this into 
a longitudinal study offers endless opportunity for exploration 
into trends in regions of the united states as well as trends for 
,~ the United states as a whole. 
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